All sources used for this video: references that support its statements
and the visual graphics shown, each with a link, the date of last access
and the cited passage.
Sources Q
References that support the statements made in the video.
0
Q1
Markus K. Brunnermeier und Martin Oehmke – Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk
“Hyman Minsky provided an early, informal characterization of bubbles and the associated busts. In his characterization, Minsky distinguishes between five phases (see, for example, the description of Minsky's model in Kindleberger (1978)). An initial displacement—for example, a new technology or financial innovation—leads to expectations of increased profits and economic growth. This leads to a boom phase that is usually characterized by low volatility, credit expansion, and increases in investment.”
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“In Section 4 we turn to the crisis phase, which starts when, after the gradual buildup of a bubble and the associated imbalances, a trigger event leads to the bursting of the bubble. This sudden transition has sometimes been referred to as a “Minsky moment.””
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“In the typical anatomy of a financial crisis, a period of booming asset prices (potentially an asset price bubble), initially triggered by fundamental or financial innovation, is followed by a crash”
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“Bubbles, crashes, and financial crises have occurred with striking regularity. There is evidence for bubbles and crises during all time periods for which we have financial data.”
Q2
Claudio Borio und Philip Lowe (Bank for International Settlements, BIS Working Papers No 114, July 2002) – Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the nexus
“This paper argues that financial imbalances can build up in a low inflation environment and that in some circumstances it is appropriate for policy to respond to contain these imbalances.”
Ex ante identification
“While identifying financial imbalances ex ante can be difficult, this paper presents empirical evidence that it is not impossible.”
Credit growth plus asset price increases
“In particular, sustained rapid credit growth combined with large increases in asset prices appears to increase the probability of an episode of financial instability.”
Why low inflation is not enough
“The paper also argues that while low and stable inflation promotes financial stability, it also increases the likelihood that excess demand pressures show up first in credit aggregates and asset prices, rather than in goods and services prices.”
Policy conclusion
“Accordingly, in some situations, a monetary response to credit and asset markets may be appropriate to preserve both financial and monetary stability.”
Credit gap definition
“We focus on cumulative processes, rather than growth rates over just one year. Vulnerabilities are generally built up over an extended period, rather than in a single year. To capture this idea, we identify a credit boom as a period in which the ratio of credit to GDP deviates from its trend by a specified amount (we refer to this deviation as the “credit gap”).”
Signal-threshold approach
“Our approach builds on the work of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). In particular, we examine whether the occurrence of a boom in asset prices, credit or investment provides a useful signal that a financial crisis is imminent.”
Sample of the empirical analysis
“By stressing cumulative processes, we examine to what extent symptoms of financial instability can be detected ex ante in a sample of 34 industrial and middle-income emerging market economies.”
Q3
Andrei Shleifer und Robert W. Vishny – The Limits of Arbitrage (Journal of Finance, Vol. LII, No. 1, March 1997)
“Textbook arbitrage in financial markets requires no capital and entails no risk. In reality, almost all arbitrage requires capital, and is typically risky. Moreover, professional arbitrage is conducted by a relatively small number of highly specialized investors using other people's capital.”
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“But if he does not, he may run out of money and have to liquidate his position at a loss.”
Q4
Markus K. Brunnermeier und Stefan Nagel – Hedge Funds and the Technology Bubble (Journal of Finance, Vol. LIX, No. 5, October 2004)
“This paper documents that hedge funds did not exert a correcting force on stock prices during the technology bubble. Instead, they were heavily invested in technology stocks. This does not seem to be the result of unawareness of the bubble: Hedge funds captured the upturn, but, by reducing their positions in stocks that were about to decline, avoided much of the downturn. Our findings question the efficient markets notion that rational speculators always stabilize prices. They are consistent with models in which rational investors may prefer to ride bubbles because of predictable investor sentiment and limits to arbitrage.”
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“For example, when the Nasdaq peaked in March 2000, hedge funds had devoted 31% of their stock portfolio to this segment. For comparison, these stocks only commanded a weight of 21% in the market portfolio at that time.”
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“Relative to market portfolio weights, the technology exposure of hedge funds peaked in September 1999, about 6 months before the peak of the bubble”
Q5
Andrew Odlyzko – Collective hallucinations and inefficient markets: The British Railway Mania of the 1840s
“The British Railway Mania of the 1840s was by many measures the greatest technology mania in history, and its collapse was one of the greatest financial crashes.”
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“But the power of the revolutionary new technology, assisted by artful manipulation of public perception by interested parties, induced a collective hallucination that made investors ignore such considerations.”
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“Seldom even mentioned in the literature, it was about half the size of the big Railway Mania of the 1840s (and thus still far larger than the Internet bubble).”
Q6
Andrew Odlyzko – The collapse of the Railway Mania, the development of capital markets, and Robert Lucas Nash, a forgotten pioneer of accounting and financial analysis
“the speculative excitement of the Mania was confined almost exclusively to railway shares, and got going in earnest in 1844, with peak prices reached in mid-1845.”
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“After that, railway shares went into a prolonged, 4-year slide, until a bottom was reached at the end of 1849.”
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“However, actual investments in railway construction moved in the opposite direction, rising from £13 million in 1845, to £30 million in 1846, and a peak of £44 million in 1847, almost 8% of British GDP, and twice the military budget of that year.”
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“Totally unknown in the modern literature, he was widely regarded by his contemporaries as having precipitated a railway share crash in late 1848.”
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“The rise of railway shares at the end of 1848 continued only a few months, and was followed by a second crash in 1849, more severe and more prolonged than the one in 1848.”
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“Long-established and stable companies were expected to pay about 4% per year. British railways did not come close to meeting that standard after the collapse of the Mania. Dividends on common shares in railways averaged just 1.9% on the paid-up capital in 1849, and only 2.8% over the decade 1849–1858, according to one estimate”
Note
“This quotation is not searchable via Ctrl+F in the source PDF.”
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“There were occasional spikes close to 4% during crises, such as the one in October 1847, or during the French revolution of early 1848, as can be seen in Fig. 4.”
Q7
Gary Richardson, Alejandro Komai, Michael Gou und Daniel Park (Federal Reserve History) – Stock Market Crash of 1929
“The Roaring Twenties roared loudest and longest on the New York Stock Exchange. Share prices rose to unprecedented heights. The Dow Jones Industrial Average increased six-fold from sixty-three in August 1921 to 381 in September 1929. After prices peaked, economist Irving Fisher proclaimed, “stock prices have reached 'what looks like a permanently high plateau.'””
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“As shown in the figure, the index peaked on September 3, 1929, closing at 381.17. The index declined until July 8, 1932, when it closed at $41.22. The index did not reach the 1929 high again until November 23, 1954.”
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“The epic boom ended in a cataclysmic bust. On Black Monday, October 28, 1929, the Dow declined nearly 13 percent. On the following day, Black Tuesday, the market dropped nearly 12 percent. By mid-November, the Dow had lost almost half of its value. The slide continued through the summer of 1932, when the Dow closed at 41.22, its lowest value of the twentieth century, 89 percent below its peak. The Dow did not return to its pre-crash heights until November 1954.”
Quote
“The financial boom occurred during an era of optimism. Families prospered. Automobiles, telephones, and other new technologies proliferated. Ordinary men and women invested growing sums in stocks and bonds. A new industry of brokerage houses, investment trusts, and margin accounts enabled ordinary people to purchase corporate equities with borrowed funds. Purchasers put down a fraction of the price, typically 10 percent, and borrowed the rest. The stocks that they bought served as collateral for the loan. Borrowed money poured into equity markets, and stock prices soared.”
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“The Federal Reserve's rate increase had unintended consequences. Because of the international gold standard, the Fed's actions forced foreign central banks to raise their own interest rates. Tight-money policies tipped economies around the world into recession. International commerce contracted, and the international economy slowed (Eichengreen 1992; Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Temin 1993).”
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“From the stock market crash of 1929, economists—including the leaders of the Federal Reserve—learned at least two lessons.”
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“First, central banks—like the Federal Reserve—should be careful when acting in response to equity markets. Detecting and deflating financial bubbles is difficult. Using monetary policy to restrain investors' exuberance may have broad, unintended, and undesirable consequences.”
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“Second, when stock market crashes occur, their damage can be contained by following the playbook developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the fall of 1929.”
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“Economists and historians debated these issues during the decades following the Great Depression. Consensus coalesced around the time of the publication of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz's A Monetary History of the United States in 1963. Their conclusions concerning these events are cited by many economists, including members of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors such as Ben Bernanke, Donald Kohn and Frederic Mishkin.”
“From the fall of 1930 through the winter of 1933, the money supply fell by nearly 30 percent. The declining supply of funds reduced average prices by an equivalent amount. This deflation increased debt burdens; distorted economic decision-making; reduced consumption; increased unemployment; and forced banks, firms, and individuals into bankruptcy.”
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“The Depression was the longest and deepest downturn in the history of the United States and the modern industrial economy.”
Q9
Kunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa und Shigenori Shiratsuka (Bank of Japan, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies) – The Asset Price Bubble and Monetary Policy: Japan's Experience of the Late 1980s
“let us characterize the bubble economy in this paper by three factors: a rapid rise in asset prices, the overheating of economic activity, and a sizable increase in money supply and credit”
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“The speed of the rise in the Nikkei 225 began accelerating in 1986 and the index hit a peak of ¥38,915 at end-1989, 3.1 times higher than the level at the time of the Plaza Agreement in September 1985 (¥12,598). Then, stock prices fell sharply to ¥14,309 in August 1992, more than 60 percent below the peak.”
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“The Urban Land Price Index reached a peak in September 1990, almost four times higher than the level in September 1985.”
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“¥20.3 trillion (4.1 percent of nominal GDP) at end-March 1999 and reached ¥44.6 trillion (9.0 percent of nominal GDP) if the accumulated direct write-offs from fiscal 1992 are added”
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“In Japan, financial reconstruction legislation passed by the Diet in October 1998 provided ¥60 trillion (12 percent of nominal GDP) in public funds to dispose of nonperforming assets in the banking sector. The figure will be increased to ¥70 trillion (14 percent of nominal GDP) when legislation related to revision of the Deposit Insurance Corporation passes the Diet.”
Q10
Elise A. Couper, John P. Hejkal und Alexander L. Wolman (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Quarterly, Fall 2003) – Boom and Bust in Telecommunications
“From April 1997 to March 2000, the Nasdaq index of telecommunications stocks rose spectacularly, from 198 to 1,230, an average annual increase of approximately 84 percent. As of May 16, 2003, the index stood at 136”
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“The dot-coms received most of the publicity initially, but the telecommunications industry accounts for a much larger share of market capitalization gained and lost than do the dot-coms.”
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“The single most important telecommunications regulatory change in recent years was the Telecommunications Act of 1996.”
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“On the technological side, passage of the 1996 Act coincided with advances in fiber-optic technology that dramatically increased the capacity for data transmission and with more efficient use of the spectrum available for wireless communication.”
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“The combination of improving technology for data transmission and the possibility of a deregulated market for telecommunications services held out the potential that providers would be able to compete for all of a household's or firm's telecom needs.”
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“The confluence of these factors led to the tremendous investment surge and high stock valuations that were the hallmark of the telecom boom.”
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“By early 2001, it became apparent that massive overinvestment had taken place in the sector, particularly in the area of long-distance fiber-optic cable. Stock prices plunged and investment collapsed.”
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“These firms, such as Global Crossing and Level 3, constructed long-haul fiber networks in the 1990s in the hopes of selling capacity to telecom retailers and selling final services to large firms with high telecom demand.”
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“With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that telecom equity prices and levels of capital spending were “too high” in the late 1990s. However, high equity prices and high investment seem to have been based on beliefs about future fundamentals, not simply on the expectation that prices would rise in the future.”
Q11
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission – Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
“As this report goes to print, there are more than 26 million Americans who are out of work, cannot find full-time work, or have given up looking for work. About four million families have lost their homes to foreclosure and another four and a half million have slipped into the foreclosure process or are seriously behind on their mortgage payments.”
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“The crisis reached seismic proportions in September 2008 with the failure of Lehman Brothers and the impending collapse of the insurance giant American International Group (AIG). Panic fanned by a lack of transparency of the balance sheets of major financial institutions, coupled with a tangle of interconnections among institutions perceived to be “too big to fail,” caused the credit markets to seize up. Trading ground to a halt. The stock market plummeted. The economy plunged into a deep recession.”
Q12
Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick und Alan M. Taylor (NBER Working Paper No. 20771) – Betting the House
“We use novel instrumental variable local projection methods to demonstrate that loose monetary conditions lead to booms in real estate lending and house prices bubbles; these, in turn, materially heighten the risk of financial crises. Both effects have become stronger in the postwar era.”
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“This paper analyzes the role of interest rates and credit in driving house price booms and busts with data spanning 140 years of modern economic history in the advanced economies”
Q13
Ricardo J. Caballero, Takeo Hoshi und Anil K. Kashyap – Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan (American Economic Review 2008, 98:5, 1943–1977)
“There is agreement that the trigger was the large stock and land price declines that began in the early 1990s: stock prices lost roughly 60 percent of their value from the 1989 peak within three years, while commercial land prices fell by roughly 50 percent after their 1992 peak over the next ten years.”
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“Large Japanese banks often engaged in sham loan restructurings that kept credit flowing to otherwise insolvent borrowers (which we call zombies).”
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“The congestion created by the zombies reduces the profits for healthy firms, which discourages their entry and investment.”
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“The continued financing, or “evergreening,” can therefore be seen as a rational response by the banks to these various pressures.”
Q14
Ben S. Bernanke – Asset-Price “Bubbles” and Monetary Policy (Speech before the New York Chapter of the National Association for Business Economics, October 15, 2002)
“If the Fed had had the foresight to “prick the bubble” at an early stage, the argument goes, the economy might have been spared needless trauma. My goal today is to look more closely at this argument and its implications.”
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“Dealing with Asset-Market Instability: Use the Right Tool for the Job”
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“As a preliminary to assessing the critics' argument, and to get my own views on the table right away, let me briefly sketch a policy framework that I believe is useful for thinking about these issues. Before I do so, I will state the usual proviso, that the opinions expressed here are mine alone and not necessarily those of my colleagues at the Federal Reserve. In particular, I emphasize that my comments today should not be interpreted in any way as representing an official policy position of the Board of Governors or the Federal Open Market Committee.”
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“When this moral hazard is present, credit flows rapidly into inelastically supplied assets, such as real estate. Rapid appreciation is the result, until the inevitable albeit belated regulatory crackdown stops the flow of credit and leads to an asset-price crash.”
Q15
Lars E. O. Svensson – Cost-Benefit Analysis of Leaning Against the Wind
“A simple and transparent framework for cost-benefit analysis of “leaning against the wind” (LAW), that is, tighter monetary policy for financial-stability purposes, is presented. LAW has an obvious cost in the form of a weaker economy if no crisis occurs and possible benefits in the form of a lower probability and smaller magnitude of (financial) crises. A second cost—less obvious, overlooked by previous literature, but higher—is a weaker economy if a crisis occurs.”
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“For representative empirical benchmark estimates and reasonable assumptions, the result is that the costs of LAW exceed the benefits by a substantial margin. The result is robust to alternative assumptions and estimates.”
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“A higher probability, larger magnitude, or longer duration of crises—typical consequences of ineffective macroprudential policy—all increase the margin of costs over benefits.”
Q16
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO-14-621, July 2014) – Large Bank Holding Companies: Expectations of Government Support
““Too big to fail” is a market notion that the federal government would intervene to prevent the failure of a large, complex financial institution to avoid destabilizing the financial sector and the economy. Expectations of government rescues can distort investor incentives to properly price the risks of firms they view as too big to fail, potentially giving rise to funding and other advantages for these firms.”
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“While views varied among market participants with whom GAO spoke, many believed that recent regulatory reforms have reduced but not eliminated the likelihood the federal government would prevent the failure of one of the largest bank holding companies.”
Q17
International Monetary Fund (IMF Country Report No. 14/48, Israel: Selected Issues) – The Housing Market in Israel
“Property prices in Israel are currently about 25 percent above their equilibrium value, owing largely to low mortgage interest rates and supply shortages. The risk of a sharp correction in house prices, while mitigated by the supply shortages, remains a concern and could have important macro-financial implications. To contain such risks, macroprudential policies should be further tightened. At the same time, concerted efforts should be made to alleviate supply-side constraints.”
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“July 2010: To increase banks' loss absorption capacity in the event of a housing crisis or an economic downturn, supplemental reserve requirements of 0.75 percent were instituted for all outstanding mortgages with a Loan-to-Value ratio (LTV) that exceeds 60 percent.”
Q18
Nitzan Tzur-Ilan (Bank of Israel, Research Department, Occasional Paper 2019.01, June 2019) – Macroprudential Policy: Implementation, Effects, and Lessons
“The primary aim of MPP is to reduce systemic risk, especially the frequency and depth of financial crises.”
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“In practice, many countries translated the MPP objectives to focus on dampening house price-credit cycle, e.g. limiting credit growth and the rate of house price appreciation.”
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“One possible reason for that is the extensive evidence that the most important cause of financial crises is real estate booms and busts.”
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“Unlike stock prices, where returns follow random walks, returns on housing are positively serially correlated (Case and Shiller, 1990), which means that once a bubble starts, speculation becomes more attractive, which in turn makes the bubble longer-lived.”
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“Additionally, house purchases and construction projects are often credit-financed and the credit is often provided by leveraged lenders.”
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“They include the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB), which protects the financial system and the liquidity coverage ratio, which reduces the buildup of liquidity and foreign-exchange risks associated with lending booms.”
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“The most common such tool is the LTV limit. As mentioned, most MPP tools used throughout the world are from this category.”
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“LTV ratios are the most widely used MPP tool, followed by DTI and leverage ratios for banks.”
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“Based on the Israeli experience of implementing MPP, I argue that coordination between the regulatory authorities supervising different sectors of the financial system is crucial for the successful implementation of MPP.”
Q19
Karl E. Case, John M. Quigley und Robert J. Shiller (NBER Working Paper No. 8606) – Comparing Wealth Effects: The Stock Market versus the Housing Market
“In the international comparison, the elasticity ranges from 0.11 to 0.17. In the cross state comparison, the estimated elasticity is between 0.05 and 0.09. In contrast, the estimated effects of financial wealth upon consumption are smaller. In the simplest model, the estimate from the country panel is 0.02.”
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“We examine the link between increases in housing wealth, financial wealth, and consumer spending. We rely upon a panel of 14 countries observed annually for various periods during the past 25 years and a panel of U.S. states observed quarterly during the 1980s and 1990s.”
Q20
Ryan Niladri Banerjee und Boris Hofmann (BIS Working Papers No 882, September 2020) – Corporate zombies: Anatomy and life cycle
“We find a rise in the share of zombie firms from 4% in the late 1980s to 15% in 2017. These zombie firms are smaller, less productive, more leveraged and invest less in physical and intangible capital. Their performance deteriorates several years before zombification and remains poor in subsequent years. 25% of zombie companies exited the market (died), while 60% formally recovered from zombie status. However, recovered zombies underperform compared to firms that have never been zombies and they face a high probability of relapsing into zombie status.”
Q21
Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS Papers No 38, May 2010) – Macroprudential instruments and frameworks: a stocktaking of issues and experiences
“Central banks will face a range of issues as macroprudential policy frameworks are developed and applied, because of central banks' roles in financial stability, and because successful macroprudential policy can help stabilise the economy.”
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“The report includes summary results from a survey of central banks on their conceptions of macroprudential policy and their use of macroprudential instruments, and from a central bank workshop on the use of macroprudential instruments relating to property lending markets, many of which have been applied in emerging economies”
Q21.1
Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS Papers No 38, May 2010, BIS) – Macroprudential instruments and frameworks: a stocktaking of issues and experiences (vollständiges PDF)
“For example, an 80% LTV maximum is widely seen by these countries as a norm or benchmark for residential real estate loans from a microprudential point of view, and a number of economies have caps at this level. Tightenings of this instrument typically took the form of 10 or 20 percentage point reductions, some of which were reversed when conditions in the targeted markets were seen to have normalised.”
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“The CGFS survey showed that macroprudential instruments or interventions had been widely applied.”
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“Survey responses indicated that conceptions of macroprudential policy aims and objectives are fuzzy.”
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“Some of the central banks from economies where these measures have been applied reported that they have been effective in moderating excesses in the targeted credit markets and limiting the financial system's exposure to those sectors. Others reported mixed results.”
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“Also, in some cases where the underlying conditions (such as interest rates) remained favourable for credit demand, credit growth tended to resume shortly after macroprudential measures were imposed.”
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“A fundamental problem with measures that sought to restrain the generation of risky products (such as high-LTV loans) was that the measures could easily be circumvented by financial engineering (as was shown in the recent crisis). This was another reason to be cautious about interventions that might bind too firmly.”
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“Once strong credit demand has taken hold, it might be very difficult for macroprudential policy to restrain credit growth, as loopholes would always be found.”
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“Institutionalisation of the aim of leaning against the financial cycle is still some way off, as is the related task of operationalising instrument usage resolutely to that end”
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“As macroprudential policy frameworks are much less developed and tested than monetary policy frameworks, they should not promise more than they can deliver.”
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“LTV caps were thought attractive by those that employ them because they directly influence credit growth, and allow macroprudential authorities to articulate and precisely signal their concerns to institutions and the public. However, it was noted that a single quantitative “bright line” measure might not reflect all the relevant dimensions of risk on the credit product.”
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“On the other hand, if the LTV cap was too high, it might not bind or it might even have the perverse effect of raising LTVs on new lending if an LTV at the level of the cap was seen as “normal” or sanctioned by the authorities.”
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“Successful monetary policy and macroprudential policy are likely generally to reinforce each other. Measures to strengthen the resilience of the financial system reinforce monetary policy by shielding the economy from sharp financial disruptions.”
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“In brief, the instrument is seen as having successfully protected banks from the risk of underprovisioning during the boom phase. It was less effective, however, in moderating the financial cycle.”
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“Authorities that have used macroprudential instruments relied almost entirely on judgment when imposing and calibrating instruments.”
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“Otherwise, formulaic quantitative relationships were scanty. Many participants emphasised that any models or rule-like operations would need to be supplemented with considerable scope for judgment.”
Q22
Bank for International Settlements (14 February 2011) – Macroprudential policy tools and frameworks
“Decline between the two cited observations = (5048.62 − 1114.11) / 5048.62 = 77.9%”
Limitation
“The checks are confined to the two stated windows; the full series history was not verified. All wording must reference the checked windows. Peak verified as the maximum of all 126 observations in the window 2000-01-01 to 2000-06-30. Trough verified as the minimum of all 84 observations in the window 2002-09-01 to 2002-12-31.”
Q24
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis – Nikkei Stock Average, Nikkei 225 (FRED series NIKKEI225)
“Decline between the two cited observations = (38915.87 − 7607.88) / 38915.87 = 80.4%”
Limitation
“The full post-1989 series was not verified. The 2003-04-28 value is the minimum of the checked April 2003 window only and must not be described as the post-bubble minimum or absolute trough of the series (the Nikkei reached lower values during the 2008 global financial crisis, outside all verified windows). Script wording must be of the form “by April 2003 the Nikkei had fallen about 80 percent from its 1989 peak.””
Q25
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis – S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index (FRED series CSUSHPINSA)
“2006-07-01 | S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index | 184.608”
Dataset evidence
“2012-02-01 | S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index | 133.987”
Calculated
“Peak-to-trough decline within the verified window = (184.608 − 133.987) / 184.608 = 27.4%”
Dataset selection
“Series CSUSHPINSA; frequency: monthly; unit: index (January 2000 = 100), not seasonally adjusted; coverage: United States; all 96 monthly observations in the window 2005-01-01 to 2012-12-31 were checked; the maximum is 184.608 at 2006-07-01; the minimum is 133.987 at 2012-02-01.”
Q26
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis – S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price Index (FRED series SPCS20RSA)
“2006-04-01 | S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price Index | 206.6561137732”
Dataset evidence
“2009-05-01 | S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price Index | 140.8418339012”
Calculated
“Peak-to-trough decline within the verified window = (206.6561137732 − 140.8418339012) / 206.6561137732 = 31.8%”
Dataset selection
“Series SPCS20RSA; frequency: monthly; unit: index (January 2000 = 100), seasonally adjusted; coverage: 20 U.S. metropolitan areas; all 60 monthly observations in the window 2005-01-01 to 2009-12-31 were checked; the maximum is 206.6561137732 at 2006-04-01; the minimum is 140.8418339012 at 2009-05-01.”
Q27
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis – Unemployment Rate (FRED series UNRATE)
“Series UNRATE; frequency: monthly; unit: percent, seasonally adjusted; coverage: United States; all 84 monthly observations in the window 2007-01-01 to 2013-12-31 were checked; the maximum is 10.0 at 2009-10-01; every other observation in the window is 9.9 or lower.”